Introduction: Beyond invisibility and disaster

There are many reasons why a cookie could not be set correctly. Below are the most common reasons:

- You have cookies disabled in your browser. You need to reset your browser to accept cookies or to ask you if you want to accept cookies.
- Your browser asks you whether you want to accept cookies and you declined. To accept cookies from this site, use the Back button and accept the cookie.
- Your browser does not support cookies. Try a different browser if you suspect this.
- The date on your computer is in the past. If your computer's clock shows a date before 1 Jan 1970, the browser will automatically forget the cookie. To fix this, set the correct time and date on your computer.
- You have installed an application that monitors or blocks cookies from being set. You must disable the application while logging in or check with your system administrator.

Why Does this Site Require Cookies?

This site uses cookies to improve performance by remembering that you are logged in when you go from page to page. To provide access without cookies would require the site to create a new session for every page you visit, which slows the system down to an unacceptable level.

What Gets Stored in a Cookie?

This site stores nothing other than an automatically generated session ID in the cookie; no other information is captured.

In general, only the information that you provide, or the choices you make while visiting a web site, can be stored in a cookie. For example, the site cannot determine your email name unless you choose to type it. Allowing a website to create a cookie does not give that or any other site access to the rest of your computer, and only the site that created the cookie can read it.

In the shadow of Tomioka. On the institutional invisibility of nuclear disaster. John Downer. 1. Introduction. On the first anniversary of the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident, the world's media gaze turned briefly to a place called Tomioka. 29 The US decision not to order an evacuation beyond 50 miles (quickly echoed by the UK), should be understood as a political calculation aimed to appease a Japanese government that was worried that a US evacuation would have led to uncontrollable panic in their capital (and which, prior to the accident, had been increasingly concerned about US military bases on its soil). Beyond disaster response, ECHO equally strives to enhance disaster prevention and preparedness, both within the European Union (EU) and beyond. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of UNISDR and can, in no way, be taken to reflect the view of the European Union. Introduction. I. excerpts from the convening papers. The Limits to Our Capacity: The Realities of Community Engagement, Resiliency, and Recovery in Twenty-First Century Crises. Throughout the seminar, the participants spoke of their experiences and efforts with natural and human-made disasters and disaster relief and recovery. Although there were differences in aspects of natural and human-made disasters, we found that there were many similar issues regarding recovery and resiliency. The participants shared some success stories, acknowledging the good work taking place and what can be learned from people doing this work.